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1053 
PROVIDING A MEANINGFUL OPPORTUNITY FOR 
RELEASE: A PROPOSAL FOR IMPROVING 
WASHINGTON’S MILLER-FIX 
Maya L. Ramakrishnan* 
Abstract: Miller v. Alabama1 set forth new constitutional requirements that necessitated changes 
in Washington State’s sentencing law for children. In response, the Washington legislature passed 
RCW 9.94A.730: a parole statute that presumptively releases children who committed crimes after 
they have served twenty years. Unless the parole board finds they are more likely than not to 
commit a future crime if released, the Miller-fix statute requires that eligible petitioners are 
released. The parole board has wide discretion in determining whether someone is more likely 
than not to commit a future crime because the statute provides no guidance about how to make 
this prediction. It is nearly impossible to determine what someone will do in the future, and 
justifications for continuing to incarcerate an individual convicted of a crime as a child after they 
have served a twenty-year sentence are limited. Therefore, this Comment argues that the 
Washington legislature should instead require that sentences for children are twenty years or 
shorter. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1996, after fifteen-year-old Gail Brashear flagged down a pickup 
truck for a ride, she shot and stabbed the driver, Dan Varnell, to death.2 
Ms. Brashear was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to fifty-
one years in prison.3 The sentencing judge—who was forty-eight years 
old at the time—told Ms. Brashear that she would be a lot older than him 
by the time she got out of prison.4 But in 2018, after twenty-one years of 
confinement, the Court of Appeals ordered the release of thirty-seven-
year-old Ms. Brashear.5 
                                                   
* J.D. Candidate, University of Washington School of Law 2020. Thank you to Professor Kim 
Ambrose for her ongoing guidance and support. Thanks to Professor David Ziff, Travis Stearns and 
my colleagues at the Washington Law Review for their invaluable insights and feedback.  
1. 567 U.S. 460 (2012). 
2. In re Brashear, 6 Wash. App. 2d 279, 430 P.3d 710 (2018); Rikki King, Court Orders State to 
Release Snohomish County Killer, HERALD NET (Dec. 7, 2018), https://www.heraldnet.com/news/c
ourt-orders-state-to-release-snohomish-county-killer [https://perma.cc/9G9J-NZKD]. 
3. In re Brashear, 6 Wash. App. at 279, 430 P.3d at 710.  
4. Teen Girl Sentenced to 51 Years, KITSAP SUN (May 9, 1997), 
https://products.kitsapsun.com/archive/1997/05-09/0007_teen_girl_sentenced_to_51_years.html 
[https://perma.cc/X6AQ-V53D] [hereinafter Teen Girl Sentenced to 51 Years]. 
5. See In re Brashear, 6 Wash. App. 2d 279, 430 P.3d 710. 
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In the twenty years between Ms. Brashear’s sentencing and the order 
for her release, constitutional and Washington state law regarding how to 
sentence children changed enormously.6 Most notably, in Miller v. 
Alabama,7 the United States Supreme Court held that sentencing schemes 
that require courts to sentence children to life without parole violate the 
Eighth Amendment.8 Miller required twenty-nine jurisdictions to change 
their sentencing practices to comply with the Constitution, 
including  Washington.9 
Washington passed a law commonly referred to as the “Miller-fix”: a 
statute that creates the right to a parole hearing after twenty years for 
people who committed crimes as children, like Ms. Brashear.10 Under the 
Miller-fix, there is a presumption of release.11 The Indeterminate 
Sentencing Review Board (ISRB), a quasi-judicial board within the 
Washington Department of Corrections (DOC),12 determines whether a 
potential juvenile parolee is more likely than not to commit another crime 
if released. Unless the person is found to be more likely than not to commit 
a future crime, they must be released.13 
Like the law, Ms. Brashear had changed.14 She had no serious 
infractions since 2008, when she remembers experiencing a shift in her 
thinking.15 She sought and received mental health treatment.16 A 
psychological risk evaluation tool described her as a low risk to re-
offend.17 Ms. Brashear participated in a great deal of cognitive-behavioral 
programming, such as Stress and Anger Management, Re-Entry Life 
Skills, Beyond Trauma, a mindfulness and meditation course, conflict 
resolution, and victim awareness classes.18 Ms. Brashear also achieved 
                                                   
6. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.730 (2019); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012); 
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
7. 567 U.S. 460 (2012). 
8. Id. 
9. Robert S. Chang et al., Evading Miller, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 85, 93 (2015). 
10. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.730; Nick Straley, Miller’s Promise: Re-Evaluating Extreme 
Criminal Sentences for Children, 89 WASH. L. REV. 963, 993 (2014). 
11. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.730. 
12. See Indeterminate Sentence Review Board, DEP’T CORR.: WASH. STATE, 
https://www.doc.wa.gov/corrections/isrb/default.htm [https://perma.cc/2J5R-2TDS] [hereinafter 
Indeterminate Sentence Review Board]. 
13. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.730. 
14. See, e.g., In re Brashear, 6 Wash. App. 2d 279, 430 P.3d 710, 713 (2018) (“Brashear has been 
a model inmate since making a turnaround in 2008.”). 
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
18. Id.  
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significant academic accomplishments while incarcerated: she completed 
an AA degree and a braille translation certification, and worked in the 
Correctional Industries’ Braille program.19 Even so, Mr. Varnell’s family 
and the prosecutor opposed her release, citing the impact of the crime.20 
Which, if any, of these facts best predicts what Ms. Brashear will do in 
the future? Which should be considered to determine whether Ms. 
Brashear should be released? 
This Comment addresses how the ISRB should decide whether a 
juvenile eligible for Washington’s Miller-fix is more likely than not to 
commit a future crime within the broader context of nationally changing 
juvenile sentencing norms. Part I places extreme sentences for children in 
the historical context of juvenile sentencing. Part II explains recent United 
States Supreme Court jurisprudence that requires additional protections 
for children receiving severe sentences, particularly Miller v. Alabama, 
and other protections for children established in Washington. Part III 
describes the mechanics of the Miller-fix statute, RCW 9.94A.730, and 
what the ISRB currently considers in making release decisions. Part IV 
argues that because just and accurate prediction of future activity is 
impossible and there is no compelling reason for children to serve 
sentences longer than twenty years, all sentences served by children 
should be shorter than twenty years. Part IV also suggests that if future 
prediction must play a role in the release decision process, specific factors 
should be provided by the legislature to ensure fair and predictable 
release  decisions. 
I. THE CRIMINAL LEGAL SYSTEM HAS RECOGNIZED THAT 
CHILDREN ARE LESS CULPABLE THAN ADULTS SINCE 
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 
The idea that children who cause harm are less culpable than adults has 
played a role in how we treat juvenile crime since the nineteenth century.21 
Extreme sentences for juveniles, such as the fifty-one-year sentence 
received by Ms. Brashear,22 are a relatively recent phenomenon.23 Long 
sentences for juvenile offenders in the adult system emerged in the 1980s 
and 1990s.24 This section describes the creation of separate, less punitive 
                                                   
19. Id.  
20. Id. 
21. BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE COURT 19–20 (1999). 
22. Teen Girl Sentenced to 51 Years, supra note 4.   
23. See FELD, supra note 21. 
24. Id. at 20. 
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juvenile courts in the nineteenth century and the rise of harsher sentencing 
for juveniles in the adult system at the end of the twentieth century. 
A. How Children Departed From the Adult System 
Before the nineteenth century, the concept of childhood in the United 
States did not exist as it does today.25 By early puberty, young people were 
often integrated into the workforce through institutions such as 
apprenticeships; thus, most young people learned all of the skills 
necessary to be adult economic contributors in an informal setting.26 
Accordingly, young people who were accused of crimes during this period 
were tried and sentenced in adult courts and were incarcerated in adult 
prisons.27 The common law provided a mens rea defense for infants—
children so young that they were incapable of speech—because they 
lacked the understanding of right from wrong.28 However, children as 
young as seven could be found to have the capacity to commit crimes.29 
In the early nineteenth century, a new social view of childhood 
emerged.30 The economy was changing: the United States transformed 
from a largely rural, agricultural society into an urban, industrial society.31 
Modernization lengthened the time that children remained economically 
dependent on their families, especially in upper and middle-class 
households.32 Children were seen as more vulnerable and innocent than 
adults.33 This extended concept of childhood aligned with and was 
supported by Victorian-era gender norms: a man’s world was at his 
workplace, and a woman’s place was in the home, raising children.34 This 
new cultural understanding of childhood fueled opposition to the 
prosecution and imprisonment of young offenders in adult courts 
and  prisons.35 
As views of childhood shifted, new ideas about what caused criminal 
behavior also emerged.36 Nineteenth-century positive criminologists 
                                                   
25. Id. 
26. Id. at 21. 
27. Matthew Razo, Fair and Firm Sentencing for California’s Youth: Rethinking Penal Code 
Section 190.5, 41 W. ST. U. L. REV. 429, 430 (2014). 
28. FELD, supra note 21, at 48. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. at 23. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. at 28. 
33. Id. at 23. 
34. Id. at 48. 
35. Id. 
36. PETER CORDELLA & LARRY J. SIEGEL, READINGS IN CONTEMPORARY CRIMINOLOGICAL 
 
20 Ramakrishnan.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/30/20  11:51 PM 
2020] IMPROVING WASHINGTON’S MILLER FIX 1057 
 
believed that human behavior largely was the result of external forces, 
such as a person’s environment and social context.37 This understanding 
implied that the root causes of criminal behavior could be cured and the 
behavior corrected.38 
Influenced by emerging positivist theories and the new social view of 
childhood, progressive reformers known as “child savers” believed that 
child misbehavior was caused by the “‘unwholesome environment, 
especially the baneful influence of squalid urban life,’”39 and that an 
appropriate intervention by the state would solve the problem.40 Child 
savers blamed immigration, urbanization, and poverty for juvenile 
crime.41 They believed an appropriate state intervention would espouse 
the era’s “Rehabilitative Ideal.”42 The “Rehabilitative Ideal” consisted of 
three beliefs: (1) that children are capable of rehabilitation; (2) that 
rehabilitation requires intervention; and (3) that the goal of rehabilitation 
was for all Americans to become middle-class Americans.43 
Child savers advocated for separate juvenile courts and institutions.44 
Separate institutions for juveniles, such as Houses of Refuge (Refuges) 
and reform schools, preceded juvenile courts.45 Refuges first appeared in 
large Northeastern cities: New York and Boston in 1825, and Philadelphia 
in 1828.46 These institutions fed, sheltered, and educated young people to 
prevent future criminal or otherwise antisocial behaviors.47 Children 
perceived as salvageable were “proper objects” for admission to 
a  Refuge.48 
States relied on the doctrine of parens patriae to commit young people 
to Refuges.49 Under this doctrine, the state had the right and obligation to 
control children where the parents were unable or unwilling to do so, or 
                                                   
THEORY 6–7 (1996). 
37. Id. at 6. 
38. FELD, supra note 21, at 48. 
39. Robin W. Sterling, Fundamental Unfairness: In Re Gault and the Road Not Taken, 72 MD. L. 
REV. 607, 618 (2013). 
40. Id. 
41. FELD, supra note 21, at 49. 
42. Id. at 48. 
43. Sterling, supra note 39, at 618. 
44. FELD, supra note 21, at 48. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. at 49. 
47. Sterling, supra note 39, at 617. 
48. Id. 
49. FELD, supra note 21, at 52. 
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where the child was causing trouble in their community.50 The doctrine 
formally entered American jurisprudence and solidified the legitimacy of 
the Refuge system in Ex parte Crouse,51 a Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
case decided in 1838.52 In Crouse, the court committed Mary Ann Crouse 
to a Refuge on her mother’s petition, but her father objected to her 
confinement without a jury trial.53 The court upheld the commitment 
citing parens patriae, stating that not only was Mary Ann’s commitment 
lawful, but also that “it would be an act of extreme cruelty to release her 
from it.”54 
Refuges exercised broad jurisdiction over young people. Their 
jurisdiction applied to children who committed criminal offenses, as well 
as those perceived in need of state supervision, such as orphans, neglected 
or unsupervised children, disobedient children, or children seen as 
troubled.55 In a Refuge, the state isolated children from their friends and 
relatives.56 Managers of Refuges imposed strict discipline, including a 
labor routine intended to teach work discipline.57 
During the mid-nineteenth century, reform schools emerged as a 
second type of institution.58 Reform schools were set in a rural 
environment and sought to reform children through agricultural labor.59 
Although presented as home-like rehabilitative institutions, commitment 
to a reform school was “‘coercive, labor intensive incarceration.’”60 By 
the end of the civil war, both reform schools and Refuges essentially 
warehoused poor and immigrant children.61 
The rehabilitative ideal and the institutions inspired by the 
rehabilitative ideal largely failed to protect Black children.62 When child 
savers built Refuges, slavery was legal. Black children in the South 
accused of crimes were subject to harsh and violent “‘plantation 
                                                   
50. Id. 
51. Ex parte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9 (Pa. 1839). 
52. See Jyoti Nanda, Blind Discretion: Girls of Color & Delinquency in the Juvenile Justice System, 
59 UCLA L. REV. 1502, 1511–12 (2012). 
53. Crouse, 4 Whart. at 9; see also FELD, supra note 21, at 52. 
54. Crouse, 4 Whart. at 12. 
55. See FELD, supra note 21, at 51. 
56. Id. at 53–54. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. at 54. 
59. Id. 
60. Nanda, supra note 52, at 1511. 
61. FELD, supra note 21, at 55. 
62. Sterling, supra note 39, at 623. 
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discipline.’”63 Rehabilitation in the North was reserved for white 
children.64 Refuges that admitted Black children to separate “colored 
sections” often excluded Black children from rehabilitative services.65 
Refuges without separate facilities for Black children did not accept them 
at all; instead, Black children were placed in adult prisons.66 
The same rehabilitative ideal that inspired separate institutions for 
juveniles led to the creation of the nation’s first juvenile court in Cook 
County, Illinois in 1899.67 Advocates for juvenile courts envisioned them 
as more of a social welfare agency than a court system.68 Instead of 
determining innocence or guilt, judges would determine what was in the 
best interest of the child and individualize a sentence designed to 
rehabilitate the child.69 Sentences in juvenile court were guided by the 
“‘best interests’” of the child, because the offense was seen as a symptom 
of their underlying needs.70 As a result, sentences were indeterminate, not 
proportional to the offense, and could continue until a child reached the 
age of majority, at which point the juvenile system lost jurisdiction.71 
According to Judge Richard S. Tuthill, the judge who presided over the 
first juvenile court, the purpose of juvenile court was to ensure “‘[t]hat no 
child under 16 years of age shall be considered or be treated as a criminal; 
that a child under that age shall not be arrested, indicted, convicted, 
imprisoned, or punished as a criminal.’”72 
But these benefits did not extend to all children. There was racial 
disproportionality from the early days of juvenile courts. Black children 
were less likely to have their cases dismissed, more likely to experience 
corporal punishment, and more likely to come into contact with the 
juvenile court at an earlier age.73 
                                                   
63. Id. at 623–24. Like all aspects of chattel slavery, “plantation discipline” was harsh, violent, and 
dehumanizing. The most widely used punishment on plantations was whipping. Christopher R. Adamson, 
Punishment After Slavery: Southern State Penal Systems, 1865–1890, 30 SOC. PROBS. 555, 560 (1983). 
64. Sterling, supra note 39, at 623. 
65. Id. at 623–24. 
66. Id. 
67. FELD, supra note 21, at 55. 
68. Sterling, supra note 39, at 619. 
69. Id. 
70. Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 MINN. L. REV. 691, 695 (1991) 
(internal citation omitted). 
71. Id. 
72. David S. Tanenhaus & Steven A. Drizin, Owing to the Extreme Youth of the Accused: The 
Changing Legal Response to Juvenile Homicide, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 641, 665 (2002) 
(internal citation omitted). 
73. Sterling, supra note 39, at 632–33. 
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Just as juvenile courts had a different purpose than criminal courts, 
early juvenile courts had different procedures. They lacked formality and 
many procedural protections.74 The informality was theoretically intended 
to create proceedings that were non-adversarial and rehabilitative.75 In 
practice, a lack of formal procedural protections often resulted in children 
experiencing “condescension, inconsistency, hypocrisy, favoritism, or 
whimsy” in juvenile courts.76 
Despite concerns about the absence of procedural protections, juvenile 
courts quickly spread. By 1925, all but two states had separate juvenile 
courts.77 The early twentieth-century juvenile court in Illinois had original 
and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases of any male child under 
seventeen-years-old, and any female child under eighteen-years-old, 
including serious and violent offenses.78 An informal agreement with the 
state attorney’s office allowed some cases to be passively transferred to 
criminal court, and a few cases—less than 1% between 1915 and 1919—
were actively transferred.79 As a result, the juvenile court heard the vast 
majority of offenses committed by children, including serious and violent 
offenses such as homicides.80 
B. How Children Returned to the Adult System 
During the 1980s and early 1990s, the United States experienced a 
sharp uptick in violent juvenile crime.81 Between 1980 and 1994, juvenile 
arrests for murder jumped by 99%.82 Juvenile crime was the subject of 
significant attention by policy makers, the media, and the general public.83 
During this time, Black children were arrested for violent crimes at a rate 
about five times higher than white children.84 The media commonly used 
sensationalized descriptions of Black youth, such as animalistic, wild, and 
predatory.85 For example, the New York Times infamously referred to 
                                                   
74. Id. at 619. 
75. Id.  
76. ANTHONY M. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS 160 (1997).  
77. Sterling, supra note 39, at 622. 
78. Tanenhaus & Drizin, supra note 72, at 646–47. 
79. Id. at 647–48. 
80. Id. at 648. 
81. JEFFREY BUTTS & JEREMY TRAVIS, THE RISE AND FALL OF AMERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE: 
1980 TO 2000, at 2 (2002), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/60381/410437-The-
Rise-and-Fall-of-American-Youth-Violence.PDF [https://perma.cc/XK45-TD2L]. 
82. Id. at 2. 
83. Id. 
84. FELD, supra note 21, at 203. 
85. Michael Welch et al., Youth Violence and Race in the Media: The Emergence of “Wilding” as 
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five Black teenagers accused of raping a woman in Central Park as a “wolf 
pack.”86 This racism fueled public response to the rise in crime.87 
In 1996, then First Lady Hillary Clinton referred to young people who 
committed crimes as “super predators,” kids with “no conscience, no 
empathy.”88 The term was coined by political scientist John DiLulio, who 
predicted that the rise in crime would continue. “Tens of thousands of 
severely morally impoverished juvenile super-predators” were on the 
horizon, “capable of committing the most heinous acts of physical 
violence for the most trivial reasons.”89 
“Adult time for adult crime” became a common refrain for advocates 
of tough-on-crime reform.90 Between 1992 and 1999, forty-nine states and 
the District of Columbia amended their transfer statutes, making it easier 
to try juveniles in adult court.91 These changes included expanding or 
creating a list of offenses that automatically transferred juveniles to adult 
court, transferring discretion from the juvenile court to the prosecutor, and 
lowering the minimum age of transfer.92 In adult court, children were 
subject to other tough-on-crime reforms, such as mandatory minimums 
and truth-in-sentencing laws.93 Following these changes, many children 
received very long sentences.94 For example, juveniles transferred to adult 
court who were convicted of murder received, on average, sentences two 
and a half years longer than adults convicted of the same crime.95 
                                                   
an Invention of the Press, 11 RACE, GENDER & CLASS 36, 37–38 (2004). 
86. Opinion, The Jogger and the Wolf Pack, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 1989), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1989/04/26/opinion/the-jogger-and-the-wolf-pack.html 
[https://perma.cc/NVR4-TR5B]. The Central Park Five were convicted with no physical evidence 
based on confessions they claim were coerced. They were exonerated based on DNA evidence in 
2002. See Jim Dwyer, The True Story of How a City in Fear Brutalized the Central Park Five, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/30/arts/television/when-they-see-us-real-
story.html [https://perma.cc/V88H-KZQB]. 
87. FELD, supra note 21, at 203. 
88. C-SPAN, 1996: Hillary Clinton on “Superpredators” (C-SPAN), YOUTUBE (Feb. 25, 2016), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j0uCrA7ePno [https://perma.cc/R4CT-E28N]. 
89. John DiLulio, The Coming of the Super—Predators, WASH. EXAMINER (Nov. 27, 1995), 
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/weekly-standard/the-coming-of-the-super-predators 
[https://perma.cc/6TV5-5GRC]. 
90. Tanenhaus & Drizin, supra note 72, at 664. 
91. John R. Mills et al., Juvenile Life Without Parole in Law and Practice: Chronicling the Rapid 
Change Underway, 65 AM. U. L. REV. 535, 584–85 (2016). 
92. Id. 
93. Tanenhaus & Drizin, supra note 72, at 665. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. 
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The predicted wave of juvenile crime never came.96 After peaking in 
1994, juvenile violent crime rapidly dropped.97 By 2000, the juvenile 
arrest rate for violent crimes had returned to almost as low as it had been 
in 1980.98 Some research suggests that the spike and fall of violent crime 
was caused by childhood exposure to lead, commonly added to gasoline 
between the end of World War II until the 1970s.99 Other explanations for 
this drop are an increase of after-school programs, such as Boys and Girls 
Club, and increased norms of pre-natal care resulting in a lower 
prevalence of Fetal Alcohol Syndrome.100 Despite its non-arrival, the 
tough sentencing and transfer laws that passed to prepare for the “super-
predator” wave remain in effect in most states today.101 
II. AFTER MILLER, THE CONSTITUTION REQUIRES THAT 
THE CRIMINAL LEGAL SYSTEM TREAT CHILDREN WHO 
COMMIT SERIOUS CRIMES DIFFERENTLY THAN ADULTS 
In the two-decade period between Ms. Brashear’s conviction102 and the 
order for her release in 2018,103 juvenile sentencing throughout the United 
States underwent a sea change.104 In 2014, the Washington State 
Legislature enacted the “Miller-fix” statute, RCW 9.94A.730, which 
provides an opportunity for parole to juveniles that have served twenty 
years of their original sentences.105 This statute followed the United States 
Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama.106 In Miller, the Court 
held that sentencing schemes that resulted in mandatory life without 
parole sentences were unconstitutional.107 This holding affected twenty-
nine jurisdictions, including Washington.108 Miller follows in the 
footsteps of two other Supreme Court cases that impacted the types of 
                                                   
96. Mills et al., supra note 91, at 585.  
97. BUTTS & TRAVIS, supra note 81, at 5. 
98. Id. 
99. Kevin Drum, Lead: America’s Real Criminal Element, MOTHER JONES (Feb. 2013), 
https://www.motherjones.com/environment/2016/02/lead-exposure-gasoline-crime-increase-
children-health/ [https://perma.cc/WN3L-XTAN]. 
100. UNIV. OF PA., UNDERSTANDING THE “WHYS” BEHIND JUVENILE CRIME TRENDS 11 (2012). 
101. Razo, supra note 27, at 441. 
102. Teen Girl Sentenced to 51 Years, supra note 4. 
103. In re Brashear, 6 Wash. App. 2d 279, 430 P.3d 710 (2018). 
104. See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 718, 733–34 (2016) (describing the 
evolution of constitutional restrictions on juvenile sentencing in the 2000s). 
105. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.730 (2019).  
106. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). 
107. Id. 
108. Id. 
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sentences juveniles can receive:109 Roper v. Simmons110 and Graham 
v.  Florida.111 
This section explains the constitutional requirements for juvenile 
sentencing under the cases leading up to Miller. Then, it addresses the 
logic of and impact of Miller. Finally, it discusses additional restraints on 
juvenile sentencing imposed by Washington courts following Miller. 
A. After Roper and Graham, the United States Constitution Places 
Substantive Limits on the Sentences That Children Can Receive 
The idea that children are less culpable than adults and must receive 
different treatment when they commit criminal offenses is hundreds of 
years old.112 But before 2000, most United States Supreme Court 
jurisprudence concerning juveniles only addressed procedural 
protections.113 Contemporary scientific research confirms that children’s 
brains are still developing until about age twenty-five, making them less 
culpable for their actions and more capable of reform.114 
Citing this research, the Supreme Court acknowledged a substantive 
right unique to children in Roper v. Simmons115 in 2005.116 In Roper, the 
Supreme Court held that executing people for crimes they committed 
before their eighteenth birthdays violated the Eighth Amendment.117 The 
Court explained that the death penalty is the most severe punishment our 
society uses and must therefore be limited to those who have committed 
the worst crimes and are the most culpable.118 Children exhibited three 
major differences from adults such that they “cannot with reliability be 
classified among the worst offenders.”119 First, scientific and sociological 
                                                   
109. Straley, supra note 10, at 968. 
110. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
111. 560 U.S. 48 (2015). 
112. See supra section I.A.  
113. See, e.g., Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984) (addressing due process of juvenile pretrial 
detention statute); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979) (addressing juvenile Miranda rights); 
Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975) (addressing double jeopardy in juvenile court); McKeiver v. 
Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (addressing right to jury trial in juvenile court); In re Winship, 
397 U.S. 358 (1970) (addressing right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt in juvenile court); In re 
Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (addressing juvenile right to notice, right to counsel and privilege against 
self-incrimination). 
114. Straley, supra note 10, at 970. 
115. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
116. Id. at 578. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. at 568. 
119. Id. at 569.  
 
20 Ramakrishnan.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/30/20  11:51 PM 
1064 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:1053 
 
research confirmed that children are immature, often resulting in poorly-
considered actions.120 Next, children are more susceptible to their peers or 
other negative influences.121 Finally, children’s identities are not fully 
formed, and their personality traits continue to change as they grow.122 
Because of these differences, “[i]t is difficult even for expert 
psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile offender whose crime 
reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile 
offender whose crimes reflects irreparable corruption.”123 This difficulty 
required a categorical ban on the death penalty for children, to prevent the 
chance that a child who is less than the most culpable would be put 
to  death.124 
The Roper Court noted that these same traits that lessen children’s 
culpability when they commit crimes similarly lessen the penological 
justifications for the death penalty.125 The two goals of the death penalty 
are retribution and deterrence of capital crimes.126 “Retribution is not 
proportional if the law’s most severe penalty is imposed on one whose 
culpability or blameworthiness is diminished, to a substantial degree, by 
reason of youth and immaturity.”127 As to deterrence, there is no evidence 
that the existence of a juvenile death penalty has any deterrent effect on 
children who might commit crimes.128 The immaturity and lack of insight 
that make children less culpable for their criminal behavior also suggest 
that children are less susceptible to deterrence.129 
Five years later, in Graham v. Florida,130 using similar reasoning, the 
Supreme Court held life without parole sentences are unconstitutional 
when given to juveniles who have committed crimes other than 
homicide.131 Experts have noted that it was unusual that the Graham Court 
applied logic from Roper, a death penalty case, in a non-death context.132 
Although the Eighth Amendment requires extremely careful scrutiny of 
                                                   
120. Id.  
121. Id. 
122. Id. at 570.  
123. Id. at 573. 
124. Id.  
125. Id. at 571.  
126. Id. 
127. Id.  
128. Id. 
129. Id. at 571–72.  
130. 560 U.S. 48 (2010). 
131. Id. at 75. 
132. Martin Guggenheim, Graham v. Florida and a Juvenile’s Right to Age-Appropriate 
Sentencing, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 457, 459 (2012). 
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the death penalty, but historically, review of noncapital cases “has been 
‘so deferential to state interests as to make Eighth Amendment challenges 
to excessive incarceration essentially non-starters.’”133 Outside of the 
juvenile context, courts have held that life without parole sentences do not 
violate the Eighth Amendment.134 
Terrance Jamar Graham, the defendant in Graham, had a challenging 
start at life. His parents were addicted to crack cocaine and continued to 
use drugs during his childhood.135 He began drinking alcohol and smoking 
cigarettes at nine years old, and using marijuana at age thirteen.136 At age 
sixteen, Mr. Graham and three similarly aged friends unsuccessfully 
attempted to rob a barbeque restaurant.137 He pleaded guilty, and the court 
withheld adjudication and gave Mr. Graham three years of probation.138 
Mr. Graham was arrested again about six months later, after a police 
officer signaled him to stop, and he continued to drive at high speed until 
he crashed into a telephone pole.139 
Three handguns were found in the car, and the state alleged that Mr. 
Graham had been involved in several home invasion burglaries that 
night.140 Mr. Graham’s parole officer filed an affidavit with the court 
asserting Mr. Graham had violated the conditions of his probation for the 
earlier robbery.141 While Mr. Graham denied involvement with the 
burglaries, claiming he had met up with the alleged accomplices after the 
burglaries, the trial court found he had violated his probation conditions 
by fleeing, having possession of the handguns, committing a home 
invasion, and being in association with people engaged in criminal 
activities.142 For violating his probation conditions, Mr. Graham was 
sentenced to life without the possibility of parole.143 
The Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits a punishment as 
severe as life without parole in cases like that of Mr. Graham, where the 
                                                   
133. Id. 
134. Compare Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 995 (1991) (holding sentence of life without 
parole for possession of drugs did not violate Eighth Amendment), with Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 
584, 599 (1977) (holding death sentence for rape violated Eighth Amendment because it was 
disproportionate). 
135. Graham, 560 U.S. at 53.  
136. Id.  
137. Id.  
138. Id. at 54.  
139. Id. at 54–55. 
140. Id. at 55. 
141. Id.  
142. Id. 
143. Id. at 57.  
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defendant is a child and the crime is not a homicide.144 Life without the 
possibility of parole is the “second most severe penalty permitted by 
law.”145 Like the death penalty, life without parole permanently alters the 
condition of the one who receives it.146 The Court noted that a life without 
parole sentence is an especially harsh punishment for a child because such 
a great percentage of a child’s life will be spent in prison if they are given 
this sentence.147 
As in Roper, the Court found that characteristics of adolescence such 
as immaturity, vulnerability to outside influences, and still-forming 
identities make children less culpable, and therefore less worthy of the 
most severe punishments.148 The Court noted that developments in brain 
science since Roper have continued to show differences between juvenile 
and adult brains, such as that “parts of the brain involved in behavior 
control continue to mature through late adolescence.”149 Regardless of 
age, defendants who have committed non-homicide crimes are less 
culpable and therefore less deserving of punishment, than those that have 
caused the death of another.150 Thus, children who have committed 
nonhomicide crimes have two types of lessened culpability: lessened 
culpability due to their age, and lessened culpability because their crime 
is not a homicide.151 
The Court found the penological justifications of the punishment could 
not support the sentence either. Retribution “cannot support the sentence 
at issue here,”152 because it was not proportionate to Mr. Graham’s 
culpability, which is lessened by the nonhomicidal nature of the crime, as 
well as Mr. Graham’s age.153 Just as in Roper, deterrence could not justify 
the sentence because deterrence is not effective for children.154 
Incapacitation did not justify the severity of life without parole because 
that justification is premised on the assumption that a child who commits 
                                                   
144. Id. at 82.  
145. Id. (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part)). 
146. Id.  
147. Id. at 70.  
148. Id. at 68.  
149. Id. (citing Brief for Am. Medical Ass’n et al. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 
16–24, Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (Nos. 08-7412, 08-7621); Brief for Am. Psychological 
Ass’n et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 22–27, Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) 
(Nos. 08-7412, 08-7621).  
150. Id. at 69. 
151. Id.  
152. Id. at 71.  
153. Id.  
154. Id. at 72. 
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non-homicide crimes cannot be reformed.155 Finally, rehabilitation cannot 
justify life without parole, because life without parole “forswears 
altogether the rehabilitative ideal.”156 Someone who will never reenter 
society has no reason to be rehabilitated. 
For these reasons, the Court held that although the Constitution did not 
require juveniles convicted of a nonhomicide crime to be eventually freed, 
they must be given a meaningful opportunity for release.157 
B. After Miller, the United States Constitution Limits the Sentences 
That State Law May Impose on Juveniles 
In Miller v. Alabama, the Supreme addressed whether state law can 
require the imposition of a life without parole sentence on children.158 The 
Court consolidated two cases to determine whether the sentencing 
schemes that require courts to sentence children to life without parole are 
consistent with the Eighth Amendment.159 In so ruling, the Court 
invalidated the sentencing schemes of twenty-nine jurisdictions.160 
The first case involved Kuntrell Jackson, who was fourteen-years-old 
when he and two other boys decided to rob a video store.161 On the way 
to the store, Mr. Jackson discovered that one of the boys was carrying a 
sawed-off shotgun.162 Mr. Jackson waited outside the store while the other 
two boys entered the store and demanded money from the store clerk.163 
When the store clerk threatened to call the police, the boy with the sawed-
off shotgun shot and killed her.164 Mr. Jackson was convicted of felony 
murder and aggravated robbery.165 Under Arkansas law, the only 
punishment the court could give was life without parole.166 
The second case was that of Evan Miller, was also fourteen years old 
when he committed his crime.167 Mr. Miller grew up in and out of foster 
care—his mother struggled with alcoholism and drug addiction, and his 
                                                   
155. Id.  
156. Id. at 74.  
157. Id. at 75. 
158. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012). 
159. Id.  
160. Id. 
161. Id.  
162. Id.  
163. Id.  
164. Id. at 466.  
165. Id. 
166. Id.  
167. Id. at 467. 
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stepfather abused him.168 Mr. Miller had attempted suicide four times, the 
first time when he was six-years-old.169 One night, a neighbor purchased 
drugs from Mr. Miller’s mother.170 Mr. Miller and a friend accompanied 
the neighbor to his trailer.171 The three of them smoked marijuana and 
played drinking games until the neighbor passed out.172 Mr. Miller stole 
the neighbor’s wallet, and split the contents with his friend, but the 
neighbor awoke and grabbed Mr. Miller by the throat.173 Mr. Miller’s 
friend struck the neighbor with a nearby baseball bat, causing the neighbor 
to release Mr. Miller.174 Once released, Mr. Miller grabbed the bat and 
struck the neighbor repeatedly.175 Mr. Miller and the friend lit a fire at the 
neighbor’s trailer to cover up the crime, and the neighbor died of his 
injuries and smoke inhalation.176 Mr. Miller was charged and convicted of 
murder in the course of arson, which in Alabama carried a mandatory 
minimum of life without parole.177 
Addressing the constitutionality of these sentences, the Court followed 
the same logic it developed in Roper and Graham178: “Children are 
constitutionally different from adults for the purposes of sentencing”179 
because they are immature, impulsive, vulnerable to outside influences, 
and have a greater capacity for change.180 Juveniles are often less able to 
remove themselves from brutal or dysfunctional situations than adults.181 
These differences reduce the penological justifications for a life without 
parole sentence: the case for retribution is not as strong where culpability 
is reduced, deterrence is unlikely to affect juvenile behavior, 
incapacitation assumes that juveniles will never change, and rehabilitation 
is not a goal of a life without parole sentence.182 
                                                   
168. Id. 
169. Id. 
170. Id. 
171. Id. 
172. Id. 
173. Id. 
174. Id. 
175. Id. 
176. Id. 
177. Id. at 469. 
178. See id. at 470 (“Here, the confluence of these two lines of precedent leads to the conclusion 
that mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juveniles violate the Eighth Amendment.”). 
179. Id. at 471. 
180. Id.  
181. Id. at 477. 
182. Id. at 472–73.  
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The Court recognized that a life sentence without parole is a severe 
penalty, and found a life sentence especially harsh for juveniles, who 
would spend more total years and a greater percentage of their lives 
incarcerated than a similarly-situated adult.183 Mandatory sentencing 
schemes prevent the sentencer from considering a young defendant’s age, 
circumstances, and the possibility of rehabilitation.184 For example, the 
trial court could not consider that Kuntrell Jackson’s age made him 
susceptible to peer pressure when he continued to the store  even after 
becoming aware of his co-defendant’s gun.185 Similarly, the trial court 
could not base any part of its decision on the fact that that Evan Miller 
was a child who was high on drugs and alcohol provided to him by an 
adult, that he had been physically abused and neglected, and had first 
attempted suicide as a six-year-old.186 
The Court found that because children are different, a mandatory 
sentencing scheme creates too great a risk of disproportionate 
punishment.187 While juveniles could still be given life without parole 
sentences for homicide cases, the Court held that the law could not require 
sentencing judges to give life without parole sentences without 
considering the child’s age.188 The “imposition of a State’s most severe 
penalties on juvenile offenders cannot proceed as though they were 
not  children.”189 
After Miller, the twenty-nine jurisdictions with unconstitutional 
sentencing schemes had to interpret the impact of Miller and determine 
whether its holdings applied retroactively.190 By 2015, eleven 
jurisdictions had decided Miller was retroactive; six had decided it was 
not; five were undecided; two, including Washington, had addressed the 
issue through legislation; and one had determined it was not a mandatory 
sentencing scheme in need of reform.191 
In 2016, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of retroactivity in 
Montgomery v. Louisiana.192 Henry Montgomery was convicted of a 
murder he committed when he was seventeen-years-old, in 1963.193 Under 
                                                   
183. Id. at 474–75. 
184. Id. at 477–78. 
185. Id. at 478. 
186. Id. at 479. 
187. Id. 
188. Id. at 480. 
189. Id. at 474. 
190. Chang et al., supra note 9, at 93. 
191. Id. 
192. 577 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016). 
193. Id. at 723. 
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Louisiana law, the trial court was required to impose a life without parole 
sentence.194 Mr. Montgomery had no opportunity to present mitigation 
evidence, such as evidence of how his age may have impacted his 
judgement, capacity for foresight, and potential for rehabilitation.195 After 
spending nearly fifty years in prison, Mr. Montgomery challenged his 
sentence, arguing it was unconstitutional after Miller’s ruling.196 The 
Court held that Miller was retroactive because it announced a substantive 
rule of constitutional law.197 
The Court noted that to alter unconstitutional penalties given to 
juveniles who were sentenced before Miller, state courts are not required 
to resentence those juveniles. A state may remedy those sentences by 
allowing juveniles who were given a life without parole sentence before 
Miller to have an opportunity for parole.198 
After winning his case in the Supreme Court, Mr. Montgomery went 
up before the Louisiana Committee on Parole.199 The Committee denied 
release, stating that Mr. Montgomery had not participated in enough 
education programs.200 As an individual serving a life sentence, Mr. 
Montgomery did not have access to educational programs for the first 
three decades that he was incarcerated.201 After educational programs 
became available, Mr. Montgomery, whose IQ has been estimated to be 
in the seventies, attempted to earn his GED, but he struggled to keep up 
and was deemed ineligible.202 Mr. Montgomery took the classes available 
to him, such as anger management and victim awareness.203 Mr. 
Montgomery only had two infractions in the last seventeen years: one for 
                                                   
194. Id. 
195. Id. at 726. 
196. Id. 
197. Id. at 736. 
198. Id. (“A State may remedy a Miller violation by permitting juvenile homicide offenders to be 
considered for parole, rather than by resentencing them.”) 
199. Grace Toohey, After 55 Years in Prison, Baton Rouge Man Key to Supreme Court Ruling 
Again Denied Freedom, THE ADVOCATE (Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/new
s/courts/article_00ea4dd4-5c10-11e9-81e9-8b553bae84c3.html [https://perma.cc/P5Z6-TMKF].  
200. Id. 
201. Samantha Michaels, A 72-Year-Old Juvenile Lifer Won a Landmark Supreme Court Ruling, 
But Louisiana Won’t Let Him Out of Prison, MOTHER JONES (Apr. 12, 2019), 
https://www.motherjones.com/crime-justice/2019/04/henry-montgomery-juvenile-lifer-louisiana-
denied-parole/ [https://perma.cc/CF4V-XYM6]. 
202. Id. 
203. Id. 
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smoking in an unauthorized space, and one for not putting his clothes 
away properly.204 Mr. Montgomery is now seventy-three-years-old.205 
C. Washington State Courts Have Expanded Protections for Children 
Based on Miller 
Washington courts addressed several issues emerging from Miller. For 
example, in State v. Ronquillo,206 a Washington court determined that 
term of year sentences that are functional life sentences cannot be 
mandatory without violating Miller.207 Specifically, the Ronquillo Court 
held that a 51.3-year sentence that would keep a sixteen-year-old in prison 
until he was sixty-eight was a de facto life sentence. As a result, the court 
could not impose it without considering the offender’s youth.208 By 
adopting a broad meaning of life without parole, the Ronquillo Court 
required that a greater number of children receive the protections 
in  Miller. 
In State v. Houston-Sconiers,209 the Washington State Supreme Court 
clarified that the principles of Miller apply any time an adult court 
sentences children.210 On Halloween night in 2012, then-seventeen-year-
old Zyion Houston-Sconiers and a friend committed a series of robberies 
with a silver revolver.211 “They robbed mainly other groups of children, 
and netted mostly candy.”212 The State recommended an exceptional 
sentence of zero months on the substantive charges but argued the 
additional firearm enhancements were mandatory.213 The trial court 
accepted that recommendation, sentencing Mr. Houston-Sconiers to 
thirty-one years in prison, all based on the mandatory firearm 
enhancements.214 The sentencing court expressed frustration about its 
inability to apply greater discretion but thought it was bound by the 
mandatory nature of the firearm enhancement.215 On appeal, the 
Washington Supreme Court held that courts sentencing juveniles must 
                                                   
204. Id. 
205. Id. 
206. 190 Wash. App. 765, 361 P.3d 779 (2015). 
207. Id. at 774–77, 361 P.3d at 784.  
208. Id. at 775, 361 P.3d at 784. 
209. 188 Wash. 2d 1, 391 P.3d 409 (2017). 
210. Id. at 21, 391 P.3d at 420. 
211. Id. at 11, 391 P.3d at 414. 
212. Id. at 8, 391 P.3d at 413. 
213. Id. 
214. Id. at 13, 391 P.3d at 416. 
215. Id. 
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have complete discretion to consider youth as a mitigating factor, 
including otherwise mandatory sentencing enhancements.216 
The following year, in State v. Scott,217 the Court clarified that 
Houston-Sconiers did not require resentencing for children sentenced 
prior to Houston-Sconiers, because parole through the Miller-fix was an 
adequate remedy.218 However, in concurrence, Justice Gordon McCloud 
left open the possibility that, under the Washington Constitution, 
resentencing could be required.219 She observed that it is particularly 
important that unlike a reviewing court, a parole board is not required to 
consider a petitioner’s youth and characteristics at the time of 
their  crime.220 
D. The Washington Constitution Provides Additional Protections 
to  Children 
In addition to its broad application of Miller, the Washington Supreme 
Court has held that the Washington Constitution protects juveniles in 
sentencing matters more than the United States Constitution.221 In State v. 
Bassett,222 the Washington State Supreme Court considered whether 
article I, section 14 of the state constitution was more protective than the 
Eighth Amendment and whether article I, section 14 ever permits life 
without parole for juveniles.223 
When Brian Bassett was sixteen-years-old, he lived in a “shack” after 
he was kicked out of his family home.224 He suffered from an adjustment 
disorder, and struggled to cope with the stressors of homelessness.225 At a 
family counseling session, Mr. Bassett attempted to reconcile with his 
parents and return home, but his parents rejected the idea.226 Mr. Bassett 
snuck back into the family home and killed his mother, father, and 
younger brother.227 Mr. Bassett was convicted of three counts of 
                                                   
216. Id.  
217. 190 Wash. 2d 586, 416 P.3d 1182 (2018). 
218. Id. at 588, 416 P.3d at 1183. 
219. Id. at 610, 416 P.3d at 1194 (Gordan McCloud, J., concurring). 
220. Id.  
221. State v. Bassett, 192 Wash. 2d. 67, 82, 428 P.3d 343 (2018); see also WASH. CONST. art. I, § 14 
(“Excessive bail shall not be required, excessive fines imposed, nor cruel punishment inflicted.”). 
222. 192 Wash. 2d 67, 428 P.3d 343 (2018). 
223. Id. at 82, 428 P.3d at 350. 
224. Id. at 73, 428 P.3d at 345–46. 
225. Id. at 75, 428 P.3d at 347–48. 
226. Id.  
227. Id. at 73 428 P.3d at 345–46. 
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aggravated first-degree murder.228 In 1996, at the time of his sentencing, 
life without the possibility of parole was a mandatory sentence for 
aggravated first-degree murder.229 
When Miller rendered Mr. Bassett’s original sentence unconstitutional 
in 2012, he was given a resentencing hearing so that the court could take 
into account mitigating factors.230 Mr. Bassett, now in his thirties, 
submitted over 100 pages of mitigation documentation.231 Mr. Bassett 
expressed that at the time of the crimes, he was unable to comprehend the 
long-term consequences of his actions.232 For example, he stated that 
when he was arrested for his parents murder, his first thought was about 
how much trouble he would be in with his parents when they found out 
he was in jail.233 He also submitted significant evidence that he had 
matured, including taking classes about stress and family violence.234 Mr. 
Bassett had not had an infraction since 2003.235 Nonetheless, the trial court 
again sentenced Mr. Bassett to three consecutive sentences of life without 
the possibility of parole.236 
On appeal, the Court held that article I, section 14 is more protective 
than the Eighth Amendment, and under article I, section 14, categorically, 
no child can be sentenced to life without parole.237 The Eighth 
Amendment limits the circumstances under which a child can be 
sentenced to life without parole, but article I, section 14 prohibits such a 
sentence altogether.238 
The Court used Mr. Bassett’s resentencing as an example that 
judgements about an individual’s behavior and circumstances are highly 
subjective.239 At the initial post-Miller resentencing, the judge concluded 
that Mr. Bassett’s homelessness at the time of his crime made him more 
mature than other children.240 Another judge could have found that the 
                                                   
228. Id. 
229. Id.; see also WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.030 (1996) (“[A]ny person convicted of the crime of 
aggravated first degree murder shall be sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of release or parole.”). 
230. Bassett, 192 Wash. 2d at 74, 428 P.3d at 346. 
231. Id. at 75, 428 P.3d at 346–47. 
232. Id. 
233. Id. 
234. Id. 
235. Id. 
236. Id. 
237. Id. at 82, 428 P.3d at 350. 
238. Id. at 74, 90, 428 P.3d at 346, 354. 
239. Id. at 89, 428 P.3d at 353–54. 
240. Id. 
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stress of homelessness made Mr. Bassett less able to control his emotions 
and behaviors than other children.241 
Judgements about rehabilitation are similarly subjective.242 The 
resentencing court found that Mr. Bassett’s twelve years of infraction-free 
time did not demonstrate rehabilitation, because “prisoners have 
incentives to follow the rules,”243and similarly found that Mr. Bassett’s 
academic achievements were “less evidence of rehabilitation and more 
evidence that . . . he is simply doing things to make his time in prison 
more tolerable.”244 Another judge could have reasoned that Mr. Bassett’s 
institutional behavior and academic record showed that Mr. Bassett had 
gained the ability to control his behavior and had taken active efforts to 
make personal growth.245 
The Washington Supreme Court reasoned that given the reduced 
culpability of juveniles that underlies the decisions in Miller, Roper, and 
Graham, and the “imprecise and subjective judgments a sentencing court 
could make regarding transient maturity and irreparable corruption,”246 
sentencing juveniles to life without parole is a cruel punishment that is 
categorically unconstitutional under article I, section 14.247 
III. AFTER MILLER, WASHINGTON STATE MADE ITS 
JUVENILE SENTENCING SCHEME CONSTITUTIONAL BY 
ENACTING “MILLER-FIX” LEGISLATION 
Miller rendered Washington’s sentencing scheme unconstitutional.248 
To fix it, the state legislature passed Second Substitute Bill 5064, known 
as the “Miller-fix” bill in 2014.249 The bill provides for resentencing 
hearings in some cases, and parole eligibility after twenty or more years 
of incarceration for people who committed crimes as children.250 The 
                                                   
241. Id. 
242. Id. 
243. Id. 
244. Id.  
245. Id. (“Some judges may find an infraction-free record from the last 12 years evidence of 
rehabilitation, but Bassett’s judge concluded it didn’t ‘carr[y] much weight’ because ‘prisoners have 
some incentive to follow the rules.’”). 
246. Id. at 89, 428 P.3d at 353–54. 
247. Id. at 90, 428 P.3d at 354. 
248. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.030 (2010) (amended 2015), invalidated by Miller v. 
Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (requiring any person convicted of aggravated murder to be sentenced 
to life without parole or death, resulting in mandatory life without parole sentence for juveniles, who 
cannot be sentenced to death under Roper). 
249. 2d Substitute S.B. 5064, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2014). 
250. Id.  
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parole portion of the bill is codified as RCW § 9.94A.730.251 This section 
will explain the basic mechanism of “Miller-fix” parole and discuss the 
process by which release decisions are made. 
A. An Overview of the Miller-fix Statute 
Under the Miller-fix, children convicted of crimes other than 
aggravated murder are eligible for parole after they have served twenty 
years.252 Children convicted of aggravated murder who were under sixteen 
at the time of the crime are sentenced to a twenty-five-to-life term and 
become eligible for parole after twenty-five years.253 Children who were 
sixteen- or seventeen-years-old at the time of the crime have an 
individualized sentencing hearing, and the court has the discretion to set 
a minimum term.254 That minimum term cannot be a de facto 
life  sentence.255 
After the minimum time has been served, a person who was convicted 
of a crime before their eighteenth birthday “may petition the indeterminate 
sentence review board for early release,” so long as that person has not 
committed another crime as an adult or received a serious infraction in the 
year before their petition.256 
The ISRB is a quasi-judicial board housed within the DOC.257 The 
ISRB predates the Miller-fix. Prior to the passage of Washington’s 
Sentencing Reform Act (SRA) in 1981, Washington had indeterminate 
sentencing, with parole decisions governed by the Board of Prison Terms 
and Pardons.258 In 1986, the Board of Prison Terms and Pardons was re-
designated the ISRB, and the legislature provided that the ISRB would 
parole, revoke, and supervise people sentenced prior to the SRA took 
effect.259 The legislature planned to phase out the ISRB, turning its duties 
over to the superior courts in 1992. The legislature delayed the termination 
of the ISRB several times as people with pre-SRA sentences dwindled, 
but in 2001, new legislation created a new type of indeterminate sentence, 
thus requiring the continued presence of the ISRB.260 Since 2001, people 
                                                   
251. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.730 (2019). 
252. Id.  
253. Id.  
254. Id.  
255. See State v. Bassett, 192 Wash. 2d 67, 90, 428 P.3d 343 (2018). 
256. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.730(1). 
257. Indeterminate Sentence Review Board, supra note 12.  
258. H.B. Rep. 2957 (Wash. 2010). 
259. Id. 
260. Id. 
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convicted of sex crimes in Washington are subject to “determinate plus” 
sentencing: after serving a minimum term, the ISRB considers their 
release.261 In 2011, the ISRB was moved into the DOC.262 The ISRB is 
currently comprised of four members appointed by the Governor to five-
year terms.263 
Five years before the date an offender becomes eligible for release, 
DOC conducts an assessment of the offender and identifies programming 
and services that would be appropriate to prepare the offender for release. 
DOC must make the programming available “[t]o the extent possible.”264 
Individuals who may become eligible for release under the Miller-fix bill 
are given priority for programs and treatment so that they can complete it 
before the date that they become eligible for release.265 
After someone petitions for release, the DOC conducts a psychological 
examination of the parole petitioner, which includes conducting several 
psychological risk assessments.266 
The ISRB then holds a hearing for the petitioner before making its 
release decision.267 Because it is not a court proceeding, the rules of 
evidence do not apply to the hearing.268 Washington’s Administrative 
Procedure Act—which has provisions that govern adjudicative 
proceedings by state agencies—does not apply because it specifically 
exempts the ISRB.269 The only written procedures for ISRB hearings at 
all are contained in a DOC policy that is less than two pages long.270 This 
policy requires that the hearing is held at the facility where the petitioner 
is incarcerated by at least two members of the ISRB, that hearings are 
reviewed and voted on by the whole board, that the ISRB give notice to 
petitioners before scheduled hearings, and that a petitioner’s corrections 
officer attends the hearing and submit certain documents.271 There are no 
                                                   
261. Kate Young, 2015 ISRB Release Decisions (2017) (unpublished Master’s Capstone Project 
on file with the University of Washington). 
262. H.B. 2957 (Wash. 2010). 
263. Board Members, DEP’T CORRECTIONS: WASH. ST., https://www.doc.wa.gov/corrections/ 
isrb/board-members.htm [https://perma.cc/S3PH-ZRL7]. 
264. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.730(2) (2020). 
265. WASH. STATE DEP’T CORR., POLICY DIRECTIVE 320.120: JUVENILE BOARD OFFENDERS (2015), 
https://www.doc.wa.gov/information/policies/files/320120.pdf [https://perma.cc/HE4N-BLP8]. 
266. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.730(3). 
267. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.730. 
268. WASH. R. EVID. 101. 
269. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.030(1)(c). 
270. See WASH. STATE DEP’T CORR., POLICY DIRECTIVE 320.100: INDETERMINATE SENTENCE 
REVIEW BOARD (2019), https://www.doc.wa.gov/information/policies/files/320100.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2U2K-QTQU] (“III. Board Hearings”). 
271. WASH. STATE DEP’T CORR., POLICY DIRECTIVE 320.100: INDETERMINATE 
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limits on what types of questions board members can ask during a 
hearing.272 The ISRB may ask questions about what was going through a 
petitioner’s head during an underlying crime, a petitioner’s plans for the 
future if released, or even about a petitioner’s past and present 
romantic  relationships. 
A petitioner is not provided with an attorney unless the ISRB 
determines that cognitive issues prevent that individual from participating 
in the hearing, although petitioners may hire attorneys at their own 
expense.273 ISRB decisions cannot be appealed; to challenge a decision 
not to release, a petitioner must file a personal restraint petition.274 A 
personal restraint petition does not afford the same protections as a direct 
appeal.275 For example, when a party appeals a constitutional error, on 
appeal, the State has the burden to prove the constitutional error was 
harmless, whereas a personal restraint petition requires the petitioner to 
show they were “actually and substantially prejudiced” by 
“constitutional  error.”276 
To make release decisions in Miller-fix cases, the ISRB must determine 
whether the petitioner is more likely than not to commit a future crime.277 
If the petitioner is not more likely than not to commit a future crime, the 
ISRB must order the petitioner released.278 The statute does not provide 
any guidance as to how the ISRB should determine whether a petitioner 
is more likely than not to commit a future crime.279 The ISRB can order 
any conditions of release it deems appropriate.280 The ISRB cannot fail to 
release a petitioner unless it finds that by a preponderance of the evidence, 
                                                   
SENTENCE  REVIEW BOARD (2019), https://www.doc.wa.gov/information/policies/files/320100.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2U2K-QTQU]. 
272. Id. 
273. Id. Paying for a private attorney is not a realistic option for many incarcerated individuals. 
Individuals who grew up very poor are disproportionately represented in incarcerated populations. 
For example, boys who grew up in families making less than $14,000 a year are more than twenty 
times more likely to be incarcerated in their thirties than boys who grew up in families making more 
than $143,000 a year. See ADAM LOONEY & NICHOLAS TURNER, THE BROOKINGS INST., WORK AND 
OPPORTUNITY BEFORE AND AFTER INCARCERATION (2018). 
274. State v. Delbosque, 195 Wash. 2d 106, 456 P.3d 806, 819 (2020). 
275. Id. at 129–30, 456 P.3d at 819. 
276. Id.; In re Markel, 154 Wash. 2d 262, 267, 111 P.3d 249, 251 (2005). 
277. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.730 (2020). 
278. Id.  
279. Id.  
280. Id. For example, the board could order an individual to abstain from drugs and alcohol, if it 
deems that such a condition was necessary to prevent a petitioner from committing another crime. See 
also WASH. STATE DEP’T CORR., POLICY DIRECTIVE 390.600: IMPOSED CONDITIONS (2011), 
https://www.doc.wa.gov/information/policies/files/390600.pdf  [https://perma.cc/S6L5-GXXP]. 
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even with appropriate conditions, “it is more likely than not that the person 
will commit new criminal law violations if released.”281 
B. What the ISRB Considers in Making Release Determinations 
It is not clear what the board should consider to determine whether 
someone is more likely than not to commit a future crime if released.282 
The statute does not provide any guidance as to how the ISRB should 
make the determination, leaving the ISRB with an enormous amount of 
discretion.283 There is no published DOC policy explaining how the ISRB 
makes this determination. The Author of this comment requested 
information about the ISRB’s decisionmaking process, and received a 
one-page document the ISRB uses to structure its decisions.284 This 
document suggests that the ISRB considers a wide range of factors, 
including measurable factors such as institutional behaviors and criminal 
history, as well as more subjective factors such as a defendant’s “ability 
to control behavior,” “level of engagement,” and the quality of their 
submitted release plan.285 The ISRB is informed by the DOC’s 
psychological evaluation, the defendant’s testimony and submissions, 
infraction history, and the correction counselor’s testimony. Additionally, 
because victims and survivors have a statutory right to make statements 
to the ISRB, it may have heard remarks from victims or survivors.286 
1. The ISRB Cannot Use Evidence of Impact of the Crime 
The court of appeals limited how the ISRB can use evidence of the 
impact of a crime when it reviewed the board’s decision not to release 
Gail Brashear.287 When Ms. Brashear was fifteen-years-old, she was 
camping with her boyfriend and another young man, when the three of 
them decided to steal a car.288 Ms. Brashear flagged down an adult man 
and asked for a ride. When she got in the passenger seat, she shot him 
twice. 289 The young men came to the truck, and Ms. Brashear stabbed the 
                                                   
281. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.730 (2020). 
282. See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions, DEP’T CORRECTIONS, https://www.doc.wa.gov/ 
corrections/isrb/faq.htm#determine-release [https://perma.cc/U4HP-4N78]. 
283. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.730. 
284. INTERMEDIATE SENTENCE REVIEW BD., ISRB CASE REVIEWS-STRUCTURED DECISION 
MODEL [hereinafter ISRB CASE REVIEWS-STRUCTURED DECISION MODEL] (on file with author).   
285. Id. 
286. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.730 (2020). 
287. In re Brashear, 6 Wash. App. 2d 279, 430 P.3d 710 (2018). 
288. Gail Brashear, ISRB No. 765306 (Wash. St. Dep’t of Corr. Apr. 21, 2017). 
289. Id. 
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victim several times.290 Ms. Brashear pleaded guilty to first-degree 
murder, first-degree assault, and first-degree burglary.291 The court 
sentenced her to fifty-one years in 1997.292 Under the juvenile parole 
statute, Ms. Brashear became eligible for and petitioned for parole 
in  2017.293 
At the time of her ISRB hearing, Ms. Brashear’s last serious infraction 
was nearly a decade earlier, in 2008.294 She had participated in many 
programs, seminars and groups while incarcerated, including: Stress and 
Anger Management; Re-Entry Life Skills; Beyond Trauma; a mindfulness 
and meditation course; conflict resolution; victim awareness; and a host 
of others.295 Additionally, she had completed an AA degree, and a braille 
translation certification, and was working in the Correctional Industries 
Braille program.296 Her counselor testified that Ms. Brashear was a model 
inmate and has strong community support.297 The psychology evaluation 
conducted by the DOC stated that Ms. Brashear had received mental 
health therapy, had been stable for years, and “[o]verall . . . is at a low risk 
to reoffend.”298 However, the prosecutor strongly requested that Gail be 
denied release.299 The victim’s family was required by statute to have the 
opportunity to make a statement to the ISRB.300 What the victim’s family 
shared is private, but the family publicly opposed Ms. 
Brashear’s  release.301 
The board acknowledged the progress Ms. Brashear has made, but 
found her not releasable because she “has committed horrible crimes that 
have left lasting impacts to many of the survivors of her victims,” “has 
served a relatively small portion” of her sentence, and the prosecutor 
                                                   
290. Id. 
291. In re Brashear, 6 Wash. App. 2d at 281, 430 P.3d. at 712. 
292. Teen girl sentenced to 51 years, supra note 4.  
293. In re Brashear, 430 P.3d. at 712. 
294. Gail Brashear, ISRB No. 765306 (Wash. St. Dep’t of Corr. Apr. 21, 2017). 
295. Id. 
296. Id. 
297. Id. 
298. Id. 
299. Id. 
300. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.730 (2020). 
301. Dan Varnell’s Life Mattered . . . Deny Early Release of His Murderer, Gail Brashear!, 
CHANGE.ORG, https://www.change.org/p/dan-varnell-s-life-mattered-deny-the-early-release-of-dan-
varnell-s-murderer [https://perma.cc/59WD-GYX6]. 
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opposed her release.302 The ISRB did not consider any conditions of 
release that would reduce Ms. Brashear’s risk of reoffending.303 
Ms. Brashear challenged the board’s decision with a personal restraint 
petition to the Court of Appeals.304 The court held that the ISRB abused 
its discretion by relying on Ms. Brashear’s underlying crimes, their impact 
on victims, and the small portion of her sentence served.305 The court also 
noted that the ISRB failed to discuss appropriate conditions of release or 
explain why even with those conditions, Ms. Brashear was more likely 
than not to reoffend.306 The court affirmed that under RCW 9.94A.730, 
there is a presumption of release, and that the board must order petitioners 
released unless it is more likely than not that they will commit a future 
crime.307 Further, the court commented on the inclusion of victim 
statements to the board: they are properly considered only as to “what 
community release conditions are appropriate or whether the offender is 
likely to reoffend.”308 Factors such as the heinousness of the underlying 
crime, the impact of the crime, and the portion of a sentence served cannot 
demonstrate the likelihood that someone will reoffend.309 
Because the ISRB had no evidence suggesting Ms. Brashear was more 
likely than not to commit a future crime, the court reversed and remanded 
to the ISRB to order the release of Ms. Brashear and determine appropriate 
conditions.310 Ms. Brashear was released in the summer of 2019.311 
Moving forward, the ISRB cannot consider evidence from victim 
statements, unless that evidence suggests that the offender is more likely 
than not to commit a crime in the future.312 
                                                   
302. Gail Brashear, ISRB No. 765306 (Wash. State Dep’t of Corr. Apr. 21, 2017). 
303. Id.  
304. In re Brashear, 6 Wash. App. 2d 279, 285, 430 P.3d 710 (2018).  
305. Id. at 288, 430 P.3d at 715. 
306. Id. at 287, 430 P.3d at 714–15. 
307. Id.  
308. Id. at 288, 430 P.3d at 715. 
309. Id. at 289, 430 P.3d at 715–16. 
310. Id. at 790, 430 P.3d at 716. 
311. Gail Brashear, ISRB No. 765308 (Wash. State Dep’t of Corr. Sept. 11, 2019). 
312. In re Brashear, 6 Wash. App. 2d at 289. Most victim evidence responds to the impact of a 
crime and will not include evidence regarding what an offender will do in the future, but a hypothetical 
example of victim evidence that could be helpful in determining whether or not an offender will 
commit a future crime is evidence that an offender has violated a no contact order and has made 
threats to the victim while incarcerated.  
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2. The ISRB Looks to the Psychological Evaluation and 
Risk  Assessments 
The ISRB structured decisionmaking sheet indicates that the ISRB 
considers several risk assessments conducted as part of DOC’s 
psychological evaluation.313 These include both a clinical assessment and 
actuarial risk assessment tools.314 Clinical risk assessment requires a 
clinician to make predictions based on their own experience, judgement, 
and reasoning.315 Because clinicians are vulnerable to cognitive biases,316 
this type of unstructured professional judgement is frequently 
inaccurate.317 Studies have shown that unstructured clinical predictions of 
violence are more likely to be wrong than right.318 
In an attempt to remove bias and improve violent risk assessment, 
researchers developed actuarial risk assessments.319 Actuarial risk 
assessments make predictions based on demographic data.320 Researchers 
have serious doubts about whether actuarial risk assessment tools can 
accurately predict risk for future violence.321 Although there is some peer-
reviewed and published research suggesting that these tools can predict 
violence,322 a meta-analysis of published violence risk assessment data 
found that studies where the developer of the tool studied their own tool, 
that study was twice as likely to find positive predictive findings.323 
                                                   
313. ISRB CASE REVIEWS-STRUCTURED DECISION MODEL supra note 284. 
314. Id.  
315. Clinical Risk Assessment, APA DICTIONARY PSYCHOL., https://dictionary.apa.org/clinical-
risk-assessment [https://perma.cc/XJX8-ZRJC]. 
316. Itiek Dror & Daniel Murrie, A Hierarchy of Expert Performance Applied to Forensic 
Psychological Assessments, 24 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 11, 14 (2017). 
317. JOHN MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 47–49 (1981). 
318. Monahan, supra note 317, at 47–49. 
319. Matthew Large & Olav Nielssen, The Limitations and Future of Violence Risk Assessment, 16 
WORLD PSYCHIATRY 25, 25 (2017). 
320. Actuarial Risk Assessment, APA DICTIONARY PSYCHOL., https://dictionary.apa.org/actuarial-
risk-assessment [https://perma.cc/28AD-LMU7]. 
321. Stephen Hart, Christine Michie & David Cooke, Precision of Actuarial Risk Assessment 
Instruments: Evaluating the ‘Margins of Error’ of Group v. Individual Predictions of Violence, 190 
BRITISH J. PSYCHIATRY (supp. 49) 60, 60 (2007) (discussing how actuarial risk assessment 
instruments “cannot be used to estimate an individual’s risk for future violence with any reasonable 
degree of certainty and should be used with great caution or not at all”). 
322. See, e.g., Anthony Glover et al., A Cross-Validation of the Violence Risk Appraisal Guide—
Revised (VRAG–R) Within a Correctional Sample, 41 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 507, 507 (2017).  
323. Jay P. Singh, Martin Grann & Seena Fazel, Authorship Bias in Violence Risk Assessment? A 
Systemic Review and Meta-Analysis, 8 PLOS ONE 1, 6–7 (2013). 
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Two of the actuarial risk assessment tools used by DOC clinicians are 
the Violence Risk Appraisal Guide (VRAG-R),324 the revised 
Psychopathy Checklist (PCL-R).325 The PCL-R is a twenty-item checklist 
first published by Dr. Robert Hare in 1980 (revised in 1991 and again in 
2003) to detect psychopathic personality disorder.326 The PCL-R is based 
on file information and an optional interview. It categorizes personality 
traits (such as “lack of remorse” or “grandiose sense of self-worth”) as 
well as social history into four larger factors (interpersonal, affective, 
lifestyle, and antisocial).327 Dr. Hare and other proponents of the PCL-R 
believe the PCL-R can assess psychopathy and predict recidivism.328 
There is disagreement about both whether psychopathy exists, and 
whether the PCL-R can effectively test it.329 Despite an oversized 
presence of the psychopath in the popular imagination,330 psychopathic 
personality disorder does not appear in the American Psychiatric 
Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(DSM).331 The closest diagnosis is antisocial personality disorder.332 
Opponents of the PCL-R argue that psychopathy is not a useful diagnostic 
category and that the PCL-R is unreliable to predict future violence and 
recidivism and should not be used “where life and liberty decisions are at 
stake.”333 Nevertheless, the PCL-R is widely used in psychiatric and 
prison settings.334 In 2011, a guide to “passing” the PCL-R was published, 
citing concerns about false positives.335 
                                                   
324. GRANT T. HARRIS ET AL., VIOLENT OFFENDERS APPRAISING AND MANAGING RISK (3d ed). 
325. ROBERT D. HARE, HARE PSYCHOLOGY CHECKLIST REVISED: PCL-R (2d ed. 2003); see ISRB 
CASE REVIEWS-STRUCTURED DECISION MODEL, supra note 284. 
326. Kent Keihl & Morris Hoffman, The Criminal Psychopath: History, Neuroscience, Treatment, 
and Economics, 51 JURIMETRICS 355, 362 (2011). 
327. Id. 
328. Id. at 370. 
329. See Sarah Marshall, The End of Evil, BELIEVER (Feb. 1, 2018), https://believermag.com/the-
end-of-evil/ [https://perma.cc/E3C9-3DEG]. 
330. Gabriel Gavin, Psychopaths: The Worst People Who Don’t Exist, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Aug. 4, 
2014), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/wiring-the-mind/201408/psychopaths-the-worst-
people-who-don-t-exist [https://perma.cc/7CG6-Q8YU].  
331. Keihl & Hoffman, supra note 319, at 359.  
332. Id. at 359. 
333. Willem H.J. Martens, The Problem with Robert Hare’s Psychopathy Checklist: Incorrect 
Conclusions, High Risk of Misuse, and Lack of Reliability, 27 MED. & L. 449, 453 (2008). 
334. Inge Jeandarme et al., PCL-R Field Validity in Prison and Hospital Settings, 41 L. & HUM. 
BEHAV. 29 (2017). 
335. See generally ABRAHAM GENTRY, PASS THE PCL-R: YOUR GUIDE TO PASSING ARE 
PSYCHOPATHY CHECKLIST-REVISED AKA THE PSYCHOPATH TEST (2011) (claiming to provide 
informational material enabling readers to “pass” the PCL-R). 
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The VRAG-R is a purely actuarial tool intended to predict the risk of 
future violent offenses based on twelve data points about an individual.336 
A higher VRAG-R score indicates a higher risk to reoffend.337 The 
VRAG-R is a static tool tied to the date of the underlying offense, meaning 
that an ISRB petitioner’s VRAG-R score will be the same the day they 
are sentenced as it is twenty years later when they become eligible to seek 
parole.338 Scored items include: whether the individual lived with both 
parents until age sixteen, marital status at the time of the offense, and age 
at the underlying offense.339 For example, a petitioner who committed a 
crime at fourteen and was convicted and incarcerated before age sixteen 
would have a higher VRAG-R score because they did not live with their 
parents until age sixteen, were presumably unmarried at the time of the 
offense and were under twenty-six-years-old at the time of the offense.340 
Both clinical and actuarial risk assessments lack transparency. The 
clinician who conducted the examination is not at the ISRB hearing and 
cannot be cross-examined.341 The petitioner and members of the board do 
not know what factors determined the petitioner’s risk, or how heavily 
different factors were weighted.342 This becomes especially problematic 
when a heavily weighted risk factor is a petitioner’s youth at the time of 
the crime, the very fact that entitles Miller-fix parolees to a 
parole  hearing.343 
3. The ISRB Assesses Behavior While Incarcerated 
The ISRB looks to institutional behavior, including the seriousness and 
recency of infractions.344 Serious infractions include violent behaviors, 
such as committing an aggravated assault, but also includes behaviors that 
would not be considered dangerous behaviors outside of a prison context, 
                                                   
336. GRANT T. HARRIS, MARNIE RICE, VERNON L. QUINSEY & CATHERINE A. CORMIER. VIOLENT 
OFFENDERS: APPRAISING & MANAGING RISK (2015). 
337. Harris et al., supra note 243. 
338. Id.  
339. See MELANIE DOUGHERTY, N.Y. OFFICE FOR PEOPLE WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, 
RISK ASSESSMENT TOOL: VRAG-R SCORING TEMPLATE, http://www.vrag-r.org/wp 
content/uploads/2016/12/VRAG-R-scoring-sheet-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/PN9E-6GPE].  
340. Jeremiah Borgeouis, Why I Am Not a Recidivist, CRIME REP. (Jan. 22, 2018), 
https://thecrimereport.org/2018/01/22/why-i-am-not-a-recidivist/  [https://perma.cc/A2GZ-BL4F]. 
341. WASH. STATE DEP’T CORR., POLICY DIRECTIVE 320.100: INDETERMINATE SENTENCE 
REVIEW BOARD (2019), https://www.doc.wa.gov/information/policies/files/320100.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2U2K-QTQU]. 
342. Megan T. Stevenson & Christopher Slobogin, Algorithmic Risk Assessments and the Double-
Edged Sword of Youth, 96 WASH U. L. REV. 681, 682 (2018). 
343. See Stevenson & Slobogin, supra note 341, at 682. 
344. ISRB CASE REVIEWS-STRUCTURED DECISION MODEL, supra note 284. 
 
20 Ramakrishnan.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/30/20  11:51 PM 
1084 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:1053 
 
such as possessing more than five dollars without permission,345 
organizing or participating in an unauthorized group meeting;346 or 
misusing or wasting more than ten dollars’ worth of supplies.347 Minor 
infractions similarly include conduct that would not be cause for concern 
in the outside world, such as hugging a visiting relative without 
permission,348 or smoking tobacco in the wrong place.349 
The ISRB also looks to “responsivity to programming.”350 
Programming includes therapeutic and support programming, such as 
substance abuse treatment, as well as academic and vocational classes.351 
There is evidence that some programming reduces the likelihood of future 
criminal behavior—the National Institute of Justice considers cognitive 
behavioral therapy programs to be effective at reducing recidivism in 
some cases.352 Similarly, academic and vocational programming reduces 
recidivism rates by over 40%.353 
In Washington prisons, many programs are volunteer operated, some 
by religious organizations.354 In 2017, the ISRB found that Jeremiah 
Bourgeois was more likely than not to commit a future crime, and 
recommended that he participate in faith-based “Bridges to Life” or other 
cognitive behavioral therapy-based programming before petitioning 
again.355 “Bridges to Life” is a Christian program that includes a “healing 
process based on teachings of the Bible.”356 No secular cognitive 
behavioral therapy was available.357 Mr. Bourgeois, a secular humanist, 
felt that he was required to participate in Bridges to Life to obtain release 
                                                   
345. WASH. ADMIN CODE § 137-25-030 660 (2020). 
346. Id. § 137-25-030 708. 
347. Id. § 137-25-030 755. 
348. Id. § 137-28-220 309. 
349. Id. § 137-28-220 251. 
350. ISRB CASE REVIEWS-STRUCTURED DECISION MODEL, supra note 284. 
351. See Current Programming, DEP’T CORRECTIONS: WASH. ST., 
https://www.doc.wa.gov  /corrections/pro  grams/descriptions.htm#therapy-support [https://perma.cc/VR26-
KK2H] [hereinafter Current Programming]. 
352. Thomas Feucht & Tammy Holt, Does Cognitive Behavioral Therapy Work in Criminal 
Justice? A New Analysis From CrimeSolutions.gov, 277 NAT’L INST. J. 15–16 (2016). 
353. Michelle Chen, Prison Education Reduces Recidivism by Over 40 Percent. Why Aren’t We 
Funding More of It? NATION (Aug. 17, 2015), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/prison-
education-reduces-recidivism-by-over-40-percent-why-arent-we-funding-more-of-it/ 
[https://perma.cc/W8CD-YS56]. 
354. Current Programming, supra note 351. 
355. Jeremiah Borgeouis, The Tribulations of Miller’s Children: How Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Led to Establishment Clause Violations, 46 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 5 (2019). 
356. Borgeouis, supra note 354, at 8. 
357. Id. 
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from the ISRB.358 Mr. Bourgeois chose to participate in Bridges to Life 
and was found releasable at his subsequent hearing.359 
4. The ISRB Uses Its Subjective Judgement 
Many of the factors considered on the structured-decisionmaking 
document rely on the subjective judgements of board members.360 The 
ISRB makes determinations about a petitioner’s intelligence and the 
motivation with which a petitioner participates in programming, the 
petitioner’s callousness and social behaviors, and about whether a 
petitioner’s release plan is realistic.361 These considerations all rely on the 
subjective judgement of board members. 
For example, a board member could find that a petitioner who began to 
participate in programming after the passage of the Miller-fix bill in 2014 
was only motivated by a desire to be released. A different board member 
could find that the same petitioner reached a certain level of maturity in 
2014 and became more interested in programming. One board member 
could hear a petitioner speak in a detached way about their underlying 
criminal act and determine that the petitioner is callous or unfeeling. 
Another board member could hear the same thing and determine that the 
petitioner is recalling an event that was traumatic. One board member 
could determine that a release plan where a petitioner relies on a spouse 
is realistic, because marriage lowers recidivism rates. Another board 
member could determine that same release plan is unrealistic, because 
many prison marriages end in divorce. 
Because the ISRB decisionmaking is structured to include these 
determinations, the ISRB must engage in making subjective judgements 
in order to make release decisions. 
IV. THE MILLER-FIX STATUTE SHOULD REDUCE THE 
SENTENCES OF JUVENILES TO THEIR MINIMUM TERM 
The Miller-fix statute is a substantial step towards more fair and 
proportionate dealings with juveniles convicted of crimes. In addition to 
“fixing” Washington’s unconstitutional aggravated murder sentence, the 
Miller-fix ensures that every child convicted of a crime has an eventual 
opportunity for release.362 By creating the presumption of release, unless 
                                                   
358. Id. 
359. Jeremiah Borgeouis, ISRB No. 708897 (Wash. State Dep’t of Corr. Jul. 17, 2019). 
360. ISRB CASE REVIEWS-STRUCTURED DECISION MODEL, supra note 284. 
361. Id. 
362. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.730 (2019). 
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it is more likely than not that a juvenile offender will commit another 
crime, the legislature determined that twenty years is a long enough 
sentence for the penological goals of retribution and deterrence in all 
juvenile cases.363 
But the task of determining what an individual will do in the future is 
difficult, and the ISRB has been given broad discretion and little statutory 
guidance.364 Instead of asking the ISRB to peer into the crystal ball and 
use subjective judgements to make release determinations, the legislature 
should cap sentences for juveniles at twenty years. Alternatively, the 
legislature should provide the ISRB with specific criteria to use when 
making release decisions that are within a juvenile offender’s control and 
are in line with the ethos of Miller. 
A. A Proposal: Replace an Opportunity for Release with Release 
Instead of creating an opportunity for release, the Washington 
legislature should amend its sentencing laws365 to ban long sentences for 
juvenile offenders categorically. By enacting the Miller-fix bill and setting 
a presumption of release hinged on future conduct, the Washington state 
legislature identified twenty years as sufficient time for the penological 
goals of retribution and deterrence. After twenty years, a person who 
committed a crime as a child has served their time. Therefore, sentences 
for juveniles should be capped at twenty years. Additionally, individuals 
currently serving sentences for crimes committed as juveniles that are 
longer than twenty years should have their sentences reduced to 
twenty  years. 
The Bassett Court observed that it is difficult for a sentencing court to 
fairly determine whether an individual has been rehabilitated, because it 
is highly subjective.366 Evidence of institutional behavior can be 
interpreted to mean that an individual has matured and changed, or can be 
interpreted to mean little because “prisoners have some incentive to 
follow the rules.”367 Evidence of participation in educational 
programming can be interpreted to mean that an individual has been 
rehabilitated, or it can be interpreted to mean that individual “is simply 
doing things to make his time in prison more tolerable.”368 
                                                   
363. See id.  
364. Id.  
365. Id. § 9.94A. 
366. State v. Bassett, 192 Wash. 2d 67, 89, 428 P.3d 343, 354 (2018). 
367. Id.  
368. Id. 
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The ISRB similarly makes subjective judgements about a petitioner’s 
rehabilitation based on factors that are open to interpretation.369 
However, unlike a sentencing court, most petitioners do not have the 
benefit of counsel before the ISRB.370 Petitioners must face similarly 
subjective judgements without the benefit of an advocate.371 And if the 
ISRB makes an unfounded decision, petitioners do not have a right to a 
direct appeal.372 Decisions made by the ISRB about whether a petitioner 
has been rehabilitated are as unfairly subjective as similar decisions made 
by sentencing courts, and are additionally unfair in that they lack the 
procedural protections of sentencing courts. 
It is almost impossible to determine what an individual who has spent 
their entire adult life incarcerated will do in the future on the outside. 
Predicting future dangerousness to an acceptable degree of certainty may 
be impossible.373 All that the ISRB has to make this determination are 
their own subjective impressions, faulty risk assessment tools, and 
institutional behaviors that may have no bearing on life outside of prison. 
As the resentencing court in Bassett observed, “prisoners have some 
incentive to follow the rules.” On the other side of the coin, there are rules 
in prison that do not translate in any meaningful way to law-abiding 
behavior outside of prison. For example, if an individual kisses a visiting 
spouse goodbye without permission, that could result in an infraction, but 
has little bearing on their dangerousness. Mr. Montgomery’s two 
infractions over seventeen years, for smoking in the wrong area and 
putting his clothes away incorrectly374 are unlikely to be predictive of 
future criminal behavior. 
By replacing the opportunity for release with an actual release, 
Washington can eliminate serious concerns about both procedural 
fairness375 and substantive justice when decisionmakers are asked to make 
decisions based on predictions about the future.376 Instead, the DOC 
                                                   
369. ISRB CASE REVIEWS-STRUCTURED DECISION MODEL, supra note 284. 
370. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.730. 
371. Id. 
372. State v. Delbosque, 195 Wash. 2d 106, 129, 456 P.3d 806, 819 (2020). 
373. Rinat Kitai-Sangero, The Limits of Preventive Detention, 40 MCGEORGE L. REV. 903, 909 (2009). 
374.  Michaels, supra note 201.  
375. See Mae C. Quinn, Constitutionally Incapable: Parole Boards as Sentencing Courts, 72 SMU 
L. REV. 565, 606 (2019) (“In summary, parole board punishment proceedings fall far short of 
delivering the constitutional procedural protections promised in a court of law. Whether or not jury 
determinations would be required during an in-court hearing, the processes provided in parole 
proceedings generally, and Miller-fix matters specifically, are insufficient to satisfy constitutional 
procedural protections for sentencing.”). 
376. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429–30 (1979); Andrew von Hirsch, Prediction of Criminal 
Conduct and Preventive Confinement of Convicted Persons, 21 BUFF. L. REV. 717, 743–44 (1972). 
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should prepare juveniles for release while they are imprisoned. For 
example, the DOC should continue to assess individuals five years before 
release and provide them with access to recommended programming. 
Some juvenile offenders will go on to commit crimes as adults. 
Recidivism is a serious problem in the criminal legal system, but it cannot 
and should not be solved by preventative detention. Even the current 
Miller-fix parole system assumes that some Miller parolees will commit 
future crimes. Because the ISRB must release individuals unless they are 
more likely than not to commit a crime, theoretically, individuals who 
have a 50 percent chance of committing future crimes should be released. 
Half of these individuals will then commit future crimes. To prevent 
future criminal activity from Miller parolees and all other formerly 
incarcerated individuals reentering the community, we should focus on 
policy choices that data shows lower recidivism rates, for example, 
funding education programs and reentry assistance.377 
Extreme sentences for juveniles are a relatively recent phenomenon, 
developed mainly in response to racially charged panic about a juvenile 
crime wave that never came.378 Before these “tough on crime” reforms, 
juveniles who committed serious crimes would be reentering the 
community when they reached the age of majority.379 The long tradition 
of a less punitive juvenile system with much shorter sentences 
demonstrates that there is no need to sentence children to terms longer 
than twenty years. 
B. An Alternative Proposal: Criteria by Legislature 
At a minimum, the legislature should provide specific guidance to the 
ISRB, instructing it on how it should determine whether a juvenile 
offender is more likely than not to commit another crime if released. 
Factors that can be considered to the board should be specified by statute 
and limited to those that can reasonably take into account the way that an 
individual juvenile has changed. A parole applicant whose objective 
behaviors demonstrates that they have changed should be released, 
regardless of the ISRB’s subjective impressions of that 
individual’s  personality. 
All measures of a petitioner’s risk are flawed and open to interpretation, 
but perhaps the most objective is a petitioner’s institutional behavior. Two 
decades of infraction history and participation in recommended 
                                                   
377. Ari Kohn, From Prison to College to Success, SEATTLE TIMES (Feb. 15, 2017), 
https://www.seattletimes.com/opinion/from-prison-to-college-to-success/ (last visited March 30, 2020). 
378. Mills et al., supra note 91, at 584–85. 
379. Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 MINN. L. REV. 691, 695 (1991). 
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programming allow the ISRB to look objectively at an individual’s growth 
trajectory since their childhood crime and determine whether that 
individual has passed through their “transient immaturity.”380 The ISRB 
should consider programming in the context of what is available and what 
is appropriate; petitioners should not be penalized for nonparticipation in 
programming that is inconsistent with their religious beliefs.381 Infraction 
history should be limited to behaviors that would be cause for concern 
outside of prison. 
The ISRB should not use clinical risk assessment and actuarial 
assessment tools, such as the PCL-R and the VRAG-R to make Miller 
parole release decisions. There is serious debate about the accuracy of 
these tools. Individuals have no control over their risk assessment scores 
and no meaningful way to challenge or contextualize their meaning. This 
is particularly concerning because of the limited due process at a parole 
hearing. Finally, because they rely on static data points, actuarial risk 
assessment tools rely in whole or in part on who a juvenile offender was 
at the time of their crime. Miller was decided because of the unique 
capacity of young people to mature and change.382 Tools that cannot 
reflect that capacity have no place in Miller parole hearing.383 
Community support does measurably prevent recidivism; an individual 
with strong family support and related family resources is less likely to 
commit a crime after release.384 However, it is grossly unfair to continue 
to incarcerate individuals because they have fewer resources outside of 
prison. The DOC already takes on the responsibility of providing 
individuals leaving complete confinement with the guidance, support, and 
programming they need to transition successfully back to the 
community.385 Children who grew up in its custody should not be 
the  exception. 
CONCLUSION 
The Washington State legislature has taken an important step to remedy 
Washington’s sentencing under Miller by enacting a parole statute with a 
presumption of release after twenty years for people who committed 
                                                   
380. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012) (first quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 
551, 573 (2005); and then quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48,68 (2010)). 
381. Jeremiah Borgeouis, The Tribulations of Miller’s Children: How Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Led to Establishment Clause Violations, 46 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 5 (2019). 
382. Miller, 567 U.S. at 734. 
383. Borgeouis, supra note 340.  
384. Ryan Shanahan & Sandra Villalobos, The Family and Recidivism, AM. JAILS 17, 17 (Sept./Oct. 2012). 
385. Supervision in the Community, DEP’T 
CORRECTIONS:  WASH.  STATE,  https://www.doc.wa.gov/  corrections/community/supervision.htm[
https://perma.cc/FC8P-Q3ZM]. 
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crimes as children. The ISRB is responsible for determining whether a 
person who committed a crime as a child is more likely than not to commit 
future crimes as an adult, and to release those who are not. While ensuring 
that individuals who committed crimes as children have an opportunity 
for release is constitutionally required, this specific release mechanism 
should be reconsidered. 
Because the determination “more likely than not to commit a crime if 
released” looks to future behavior, it is nearly impossible to make a fair 
and accurate judgment. The ISRB is forced to rely in part on questionable 
predictive tools and its subjective impressions. The legislature should 
instead cap sentences for juveniles at twenty years. Alternatively, some 
concerns about fairness would be addressed if the legislature instructed 
the ISRB to consider only objective factors within a juvenile’s control. 
Because the future is not static, the legislature can reduce recidivism from 
released juvenile offenders by ensuring they have access to programming 
while incarcerated and funding supportive transition programs. 
 
